Criminal Law Cases

Case Name / Relevancy / Facts / Held

Airedale NHS v Bland [1993]	Actus Reus: Medical Treatment	Doctors were granted approval to remove the feeding tube of Bland who had been left in a vegetative state after an injury suffered by the Hillsborough disaster.	It was lawful to withhold life-extending treatment as the doctors have a duty to act in the best interests of their patients.
R v Kimsey (1996)	Actus Reus: Legal Causation	D admitted engaging in a chase but not to trying to overtake just before the accident which left Osbourne dead.	The dangerous driving did not have to be considered a ‘substantial’ cause of death but rather a cause of death which was sufficient to convict D.
R v Dalloway (1847)	Actus Reus: Legal Causation	D was not holding on to the reins on a horse and cart which resulted in a child running out into the road was killed by one of the wheels. D was charged for driving in a negligent fashion and causing the death of the child.	Expert evidence was produced which demonstrated that if Dalloway had been holding on to the reins tightly, he would not have been able to stop the cart before it collided with and killed the child. The act D was culpable of was not the cause of the death of the child.
R v Pagett (1983)	Actus Reus: Novus Actus Interveniens Legal Causation	D shot at a police officer and then used a pregnant teenage girl as a human shield. The officer returned fire, killing the girl.  D was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter, which he appealed.	Neither a reasonable act taken for the purpose of self-preservation, nor an act done in the execution of a legal duty, could not constitute a novus actus interveniens for the purposes of a causal chain.
R v Jordan (1956)	Actus Reus: Medical Intervention Legal Causation	Victim was admitted to hospital with stab wounds from D. When the victim died 8 days later, his wounds had largely healed and he had been given the wrong medical treatment.	Victim died of medical treatment and not the stab wound. D was not liable for his death.
R v Smith [1959]	Actus Reus: Medical Intervention Legal Causation	D was a soldier who stabbed one of his comrades during a fight.  Victim was taken to receive medical attention but was dropped twice before reaching the hospital. He received negligent medical treatment.	The stab wound was an operating cause of the victim’s death; it did not matter that it was not the sole cause. The chain of causation was not broken on the facts of this case.
R v Cheshire [1991]	Actus Reus: Medical Intervention Legal Causation	D shot a man during an argument. Victim died after tracheotomy complications. D was subsequently charged with murder and convicted.	The negligent medical treatment was the immediate cause of the victim’s death but that did not absolve the accused unless the treatment was so independent the accused’s act to regard the contribution as insignificant.
R v Blaue [1975]	Actus Reus: Eggshell Skull Rule Legal Causation	D stabbed a woman who was a Jehovah’s Witness. As a result of her religious beliefs the victim refused a blood transfusion which would have saved her life.  D was charged with manslaughter by way of diminished responsibility.	The stab wound and not the girl’s refusal to accept medical treatment was the operating cause of death. The victim’s rejection of a blood transfusion did not break the chain of causation.
R v Woollin [1999]	Mens Rea: Indirect/Oblique Intent	D threw his 3 month old baby onto a hard surface and it died.	Murder conviction was substituted with manslaughter conviction. There was a material misdirection which expanded the mens rea of murder and therefore the murder conviction was unsafe.
R v Cunningham [1957]	Mens Rea: Subjective Recklessness	D ripped a gas meter from the wall in order to steal money but this caused the gas to escape and caused gas to leak into a property where a victim was poisoned. D was charged with unlawfully and maliciously endangering the victim’s life.	Conviction quashed on the grounds that the judge had erred in describing the meaning of ‘malicious’ as ‘wicked – this was an incorrect definition and the trial judge misled the jury into believing that if D had acted wickedly he had also acted maliciously.  The correct test for malice was whether the defendant had either actual intent to cause harm or was reckless as to the possibility of causing foreseeable harm.
Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Shimmen (1986)	Mens Rea: The Reasonableness of the Risk	D was a martial arts expert who was demonstrating his skill to friends by performing a move which he anticipated would bring his foot within inches of a shop window. He miscalculated the risk and he broke the window.	The argument that he was not reckless because he had given thought to the risk but mistakenly believed that he had minimised it, was rejected by the Divisional Court because he knew there was some risk. D was found guilty of causing criminal damage.
R v Gnango [2011]	Mens Rea: Transferred Malice	Bandanaman and Gnango had a street fight with guns where a passer-by was accidentally shot and killed. Bandanaman could not be found and so D was charged and convicted of murder under the joint enterprise rules.	There is no impediment in the law on joint enterprise to treat two Ds as acting together even if they were engaged in attempting to harm or murder each other. It was still possible for a person to be a party to a crime even if he was the intended (or actual) victim.
R v Prince (1875)	Mens Rea: Strict Liability	D took an unmarried girl under the age of 16 out of the possession of her father without the father’s consent.  The girl had told D that she was 18 and H reasonably believed that was her age.	Where a statute is silent as to the mens rea for an offence, the court is not bound to read a mens rea requirement into the statute.  H’s reasonable belief was no defence as it was a strict liability crime.
R v Inglis [2001]	Murder: Unlawful Killing	D was convicted of murdering her son who was in a vegetative state due to serious head injuries. D’s family were advised that the son may be able to live an independent life, however she still injected him twice with heroin.	Mercy killing is murder. Both the actus reus and the mens rea for murder are satisfied and the motivation is irrelevant.
R v Crutchley (1837)	Murder: Any Reasonable Creature	D strangled her newborn baby. The two surgeons testifying in the case stated that the strangling had taken place before the umbilical cord had been cut between the mother and the newborn, and thus before the baby had been fully delivered.	A murder conviction is only possible where the whole body of the child has been delivered from the mother when the mother killed it. The jury acquitted D, finding that the child was not wholly born as when it was killed it was still attached to the mother by the umbilical cord.
R v Dowds [2012]	Murder: Diminished Responsibility	D killed his partner with a knife by inflicting 60 wounds on her and sought to rely on the partial defence of diminished responsibility for ‘recognised medical conditions’. D claimed he was under acute intoxication and was a binge drinker.	Voluntary drunkenness was not capable of founding a partial defence.
R v Golds [2016]	Murder: Diminished Responsibility	D admitted to killing his partner and prior to the killing he had sexually assaulted her. He claimed the partial defence of diminished responsibility and the test in respect of “substantially impaired” had to be applied.	“Substantial” was capable of meaning either “present rather than illusory or fanciful, thus having some substance” or “important or weighty”. It was therefore not a fault by the judge to direct the jury that it was an everyday word and they rejected the defence.
R v Clinton [2012]	Murder: Loss of Control	D killed his wife because of her sexual infidelity. D was first convicted of murder and arson but the verdict was returned by the jury after the defence considering diminished responsibility where the judge ruled that there was insufficient evidence for this issue to be considered by the jury.	If sexual infidelity was the only potential trigger to the harmful act, s.55(6)(c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009 has to be applied. D’s appeal was allowed because the judge misdirected herself as to the relevance of infidelity and wrongly did not leave the matter to the jury.
R v White [1910]	Manslaughter: Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter Factual Causation	D put poison into his mother’s drink with the intention of killing her. She did not wake up, however the medical evidence was that she had died of a heart attack rather than as a result of the poison. D was convicted of attempted murder.	The test was not met, and D could not be convicted of murder. The court held that it was sufficient that the attempted murder had begun, notwithstanding that D had not completed his plan. The conviction was therefore upheld.
R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007]	Manslaughter: Unlawful and Dangerous Act Manslaughter	D and victim were living together in a hostel when the victim visited D and asked for “a bit to make him sleep”. D gave him a syringe with heroin and victim died several hours later. D was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter.	As the victim was a fully informed and consenting adult, who had freely and voluntarily self-administered the drug without any pressure from D, this was an intervening act. Conviction was therefore overturned.
R v Adomako [1995]	Manslaughter: Gross Negligence Manslaughter	D was an anaesthetist who was convicted of manslaughter by breach of duty after a crucial tube became disconnected from the ventilator and the patient suffered a fatal cardiac arrest.	In cases of manslaughter by criminal negligence involving a breach of duty the ordinary principles of law of negligence applied to ascertain whether D had been in breach of a duty of care to the victim.
Tuberville v Savage [1669]	Assault	D placed his hand on his sword and told another, “if it were not assize-time, I would not take such language”. The justices of assize were in town.	An assault requires both (1) the intention and (2) the act of assault which was not present in this case.
Chambers v DPP [2012]	Assault	D learned that an airport from which he was due to travel was closed due to heavy snow-fall and tweeted “I’m blowing the airport sky high!”.	The actus reus of the offence was unfulfilled as, on an objective assessment, the “tweet” was not of a menacing character nor could an inference be drawn. The reasonable member of the public would dismiss it as threatening. The necessary mens rea was not present.
Savage and Parmenter  [1992]	Assault	Ms. Savage threw beer over her husband’s ex-girlfriend. The glass slipped out of her hand resulting in the victim’s wrist being cut. She claimed that she had no intention to harm her with the glass, yet was convicted of GBH. Mr. Parmenter had injured his newborn son, yet claimed that he had done so accidentally as he had no experience with small babies. He was also convicted of GBH.	To satisfy the mens rea element of “maliciously”, it is not necessary to demonstrate that D intended the level of harm inflicted. Court dismissed Savage’s appeal and substituted Parmenter’s conviction to that of assault occasioning bodily harm.
R v Richardson [1998]	Fraud	D had her licence to practice dentistry suspended but continued to treat uninformed patients. D was therefore charged with six counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.	Fraud only negatived consent in circumstances where the victim was deceived as to either the nature of the act performed or the identity of those performing it. ‘Identity of the person’ did not extend to that person’s qualifications or attributes.
R v Brown and Stratton [1988]	GBH	Ds were cousins who jointly attacked Stratton’s father as Stratton found his father’s ongoing gender reassignment embarrassing.  Ds went to the father’s house, intending to assault her and inflicter various injuries.	‘Really serious’ harm was to be understood from a general and objective perspective, rather than the victim’s subjective opinion. Intoxication could be considered in determining whether there was specific intent, and Ds charges were lessened to ABH under s.47.
R v Bollom [2003]	GBH	D inflicted various injuries upon his partner’s child.  The judge directed the jury to consider the young age of the victim, and D was found guilty under s.20.	Jury should make cases depending on context. D’s conviction was lessened to s. 47 as expert medical testimony suggested that the injuries were sustained under a longer period of time.
R v Ireland and Burstow [1997]	GBH	D and victim were in a short relationship which the victim ended. D harassed the victim over several months, making repeated phone calls, delivering hate mail, etc., causing her to sustain psychiatric injury.	Psychiatric injury did suffice to be considered ‘bodily harm’. D was found guilty of assault.
R v Mowatt [1968]	GBH	D and a friend attacked the victim on a night out and then the friend robbed him. Victim chased the friend and then asked D for his whereabouts. D claimed to have felt endangered by the victim’s aggressive demeanour and punched and attacked the victim again. D was charged with malicious wounding under s.18.	It is enough that he should have foreseen that some physical harm to some person, albeit of a minor character, might result.
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981]	Defence	C and D had an argument and agreed to settle the matter with a fist fight in a public street. C was injured and C was charged with assault under s. 20.	Violence when in anger was intended and likely to cause bodily injury, and is unlawful regardless of whether consent was given.
R v Brown [2011]	Defence	D killed his soon-to-be ex-wife while the children were in another room.  The children then saw him putting their mother’s body in his car and he drove off to bury it in a remote place. Brown had an adjustment syndrome which impaired his ability to exercise self-control at the time of the killing and disposal of the body. D charged with diminished responsibility manslaughter.	It was not necessary for judges passing sentence for diminished responsibility manslaughter to set out an exact arithmetical computation of the sentence which would have been passed for a murder conviction. That was a fact-specific decision, to be made by the judge, consistently with the medical evidence and the jury verdict, and then publicly explained.
R v Morris [1983]	Theft: Appropriation	D were convicted of theft under s.1 of the Theft Act 1968 after switching the labels on products in a supermarket to obtain a lower price. One of the Ds was caught before he paid, while the other was only caught afterwards.	The owners of the goods had a right to ensure that they were sold for the price the owner chose, which Ds usurped when they switched the labels to be able to pay less.  This amounted to an assumption of the owners’ rights, and therefore an appropriation.
R v Hinks [2000]	Theft: Appropriation	D was a carer for a man of limited intelligence. D persuaded the man to make a series of payments to her from his bank account which she contended were gifts. D was charged with theft.	The meaning of “appropriates” in section 1 places increased emphasis on dishonesty. Court rejected the submission that a person does not appropriate property unless the victim retains some proprietary interest or the right to resume or recover some proprietary interest.
R v Turner (No 2) [1971]	Theft: Belonging to Another	D took his car to a garage for repairs that were completed and then the car was left outside the garage on the road. D called the garage and told the proprietor that he would return the following day, pay him and take the car: instead, he took the car away from the roadside several hours later without paying for the repairs.	D was charged with theft of the car since the car was regarded as belonging to the service station as they were in possession and control of it under section 5(1) of the 1968 Act.
Davidge v Bennett [1984]	Theft: Belonging to Another	D received cheques from her 3 flatmates in order to pay for the communal gas bill. Instead, D spent the money on Christmas presents and left the flat without paying the gas bill.	The cheques were property belonging to another (D’s flatmates) in terms of section 5(3) of the 1968 Act and she was charged with theft.
Ricketts v Basildon Magistrates [2010]	Theft: Belonging to Another	D was arrested after taking bags from outside a charity shop (BHF) and from the bins at the rear of the shop (Oxfam) and putting them into his vehicle. He was charged with theft.	The bags taken from the bins outside Oxfam could be taken to be in Oxfam’s possession at the time he appropriated them. However, with regards to the bags taken from outside BHF, no possession or proprietary interest could be taken to arise from them simply being left in the vicinity. The items still belonged to the donor until BHF took possession.
B & S v Leathley [1979]	Burglary: Building	Ds entered a freezer container that had been placed in a farmyard and stole goods from it. It had not been moved for over two years, had doors and locks, and was connected to the mains electricity supply. Ds were charged with burglary.	The container was a ‘building’ for the purposes of the 1968 Act.
R v Walkington [1979]	Burglary: Part of a Building	D was in a department store when he went behind the unoccupied counter area on the shop floor and opened the cash till drawer. On seeing it was empty he left and was arrested by a store detective. D admitted that if there had been money in the till he would have stolen it and was convicted of burglary.	Court held that the area behind the counter was part of a building under s.9(1)(a) Theft Act 1968. It was for the jury to decide whether D had entered it as a trespasser. The fact that the till was empty did not destroy D’s intention to steal.
R v Collins [1973]	Burglary: As a trespasser	D climbed up to the window of a young woman at 4 am. When she awoke she mistook him for her boyfriend and they had intercourse before she discovered that it was not her boyfriend.  D was convicted of burglary with intent to commit rape.	Conviction quashed. Davis LJ said that to be a trespasser under s.9(1)(a) Theft Act 1968. An accused should be judged on the facts as he believed them to be and this should include mistake as to his liabilities under civil law.
R v Jones & Smith [1976]	Burglary: As a trespasser	Ds entered Smith’s father’s house and stole two TVs. At his trial, Smith said that his father had given him unreserved permission to enter the house. Ds were convicted of burglary.	A person who has general permission to enter a premises may still be a trespasser if he enters knowing he is acting in excess of the permission given or being reckless as to whether he is so acting.
R v Stones [1989]	Burglary: Aggravated Burglary	D was caught running away from a house that had been burgled. When he was arrested and searched he was found to be carrying a kitchen knife, which he claimed was for self-defence ‘because some lads from Blyth are after me’.  D was charged with aggravated burglary.	It was sufficient to show that D knowingly had the knife with him, with the intent to cause injury to some person. There was no need to show that he intended to use it in the course of the burglary.
R v Robinson [1977]	Robbery:  Steals	D was owed £7 by a woman. D went to ask her for it and a fight developed between D and the woman’s husband. During the fight a £5 note dropped out of the husband’s pocket and D picked it up and kept it. D was convicted of robbery.	Conviction was quashed. There was no theft under s.2(1)(a) since D had an honest belief that he was entitled to the money.
R v Hale [1978]	Robbery: Immediately Before or At The Time of Stealing	Two Ds entered the victim’s house and stole her jewellery box from her bedroom and then tied her up. Ds were convicted of robbery and appealed on the basis that the offence of theft was complete when they took possession of the jewellery box and they, therefore, did not use force immediately before or at the time of stealing.	The whole course of conduct is considered as stealing, and appropriation does not immediately finish when D’s conduct meets the minimum essential requirements for appropriation.
Troughton v MPC [1987]	Making off Without Payment: Making off on the Spot When Payment is Required	D got into a taxi whilst heavily intoxicated and asked to be driven to Highbury and got into an argument when D did not specify his address and accused the driver of taking an unnecessary detour to increase his fare. D ran off without making payment and was convicted.	D’s conviction for making off without payment was quashed. As the taxi driver had not taken him home, no legally enforceable obligation to pay the fare had arisen and so there was no payment to avoid.
R v Fiak [2005]	Criminal Damage: Destroys or Damages	D had been sitting in a car when he was controlled for consuming excess alcohol but he claimed he was not driving, but was rather taking a break after his wife and him had an argument.  Police detained D whilst questioning the wife but D ignored this and a struggle broke out where an officer go injured.  At the police station, he proceeded to flood his cell by putting his blanket down the toilet and repeatedly flushed the chain.	The police officer’s conduct was appropriate in detaining D. Officer did not use the word ‘arrest’ until the investigation was concluded at which point the officer had grounds to lawfully make the arrest. D had sustained damage for the purposes of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
R v Smith [1974]	Criminal Damage: Intention to Damage Property Belonging to Another	D installed some sound equipment and soundproofing material with the landlord’s permission. When he was given notice to exit the flat, D ripped out the soundproofing to access the wires lying underneath it. As a matter of law, the soundproofing had become a fixture of the property and belonged to the landlord. D was charged with causing criminal damage to certain property.	An honest but mistaken belief could be used as a lawful defence to such a charge under the circumstances. The trial judge had erred in not letting Smith demonstrate his case to the jury and this was considered to be a fundamental misdirection in the law. D lacked the mens rea of the act.
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Charles [1977]	Fraud: Fraud by False Representation	D’s bank account was overdrawn and he had been warned by his bank manager not to write more than one cheque a day for more than £30. D did not listed. D was aware that the amounts that he was drawing for would result in him exceeding his overdraft limit of £100.  D was charged with obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception contrary to s16 Theft Act 1968 and convicted.	D had induced, by deception, the casino’s staff through the presentation of the cheque guarantee card into accepting cheques that he knew would not be honoured. Whilst the casino did not suffer any loss as a result of the deception, as the bank had implicitly guaranteed D’s cheques in any event through allowing him use of the card, s. 16 did not require them to; it only required that the accused, by deception, obtained for himself or another a pecuniary advantage.
R v Rai (1999)	Fraud: Fraud by False Representation	D applied to Birmingham City Council’s social services for a grant in order to adapt the bathroom in his home for his elderly mother. The council approved a grant of £9500. D’s mother died in July of that year and Rai remained silent towards the council regarding his mother’s death and the council were unaware of her death until after they had completed their work by October. D was charged with deception contrary to s15(4) 1968 Act and with obtaining services by deception contrary to s1 1978 Act.	The trial judge was correct to rule that silence could constitute a ‘deception’ because D’s conduct, as a whole, constituted an ongoing course of deception and a representation that his mother was in fact alive. Failing to notify the council constituted a positive acquiescence and a straightforward deception.
R v Ghosh [1982]	Fraud: Dishonestly	D was a locum consultant at a hospital who falsely claimed to have carried out a surgical operation in order to claim money when in fact that operation had been carried out by someone else under the NHS. D was charged with attempting to procure the execution of a cheque by deception contrary to s.20(2) and obtaining money by deception under s.15(1).	First, the jury must decide whether D’s conduct was dishonest according to the standards of reasonable and honest people. Then, the jury had to go on to decide whether D himself realised that what he was doing was dishonest by those standards. If it was, then D was ‘dishonest’ under the 1968 Act.
R v Kirk [2008]	Rape: Absence of Consent	Ds were charged with numerous counts of sexual assault against a child and D was charged with rape. The offences were committed within the context of a family over a period of 10 years beginning more than 30 years before the trial. Ds contended that the complaints were entirely false and that Cs were colluding. The judge, in summing up, told the jury that they must draw a distinction between ‘willing submission’ and real consent. Ds were imprisoned for 11 and 7 years respectively.	Fairness did not require evidence of the complaints to be excluded. Evidence of bad character was permissible on the basis that it formed part of the pattern of events connected to the indictment. Jury was not misled by the judge’s use of the term ‘willing submission’. This term was used to inform the jury of the difference between physical restraint and apparent submission which was not full consent.
R v Hysa [2007]	Rape: Absence of Consent	C was a 16 year old girl who was celebrating the New Year in London and became intoxicated. She later on got separated from her friends and ended up in a car with D, and later on believed she had not consented nor willingly engaged in the sexual activity that took place in the back of the car. D was charged with rape under s1(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.	CoA quashed the ruling. The jury are to examine the evidence and circumstances of the incident to decide on the issue of consent and whether rape was committed.
R v Jheeta [2007]	Rape: Conclusive Presumptions	D and victim were in a consensual sexual relationship. D began sending anonymous threatening messages to the victim, and promised to protect her when she confided in him. She later tried to end her relationship with D, to which he responded by sending messages pretending to be a police officer telling her she should sleep with him or be criminally liable.	CoA held that the ‘relevant act’ to which s.76 referred to was the act of vaginal, anal or oral penetration.  As such, for s.76 to apply, the victim had to be deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sex itself, and not merely deceived as to the nature and purpose of the sex itself, and not merely deceived as to extraneous circumstances For this reason, it was held that the application of s.76 would be rare, and it did not apply in this case. As D admitted to it, the rape convictions were held to be safe regardless of whether the s.76 presumption applied.
R v Devonald [2008]	Rape: Conclusive Presumptions	D, believing the victim to have treated his daughter badly during their relationship, posed as a young woman to correspond with the victim online. Using this persona, D tricked the victim into masturbating in front of a webcam with the purpose of embarrassing the victim. D was convicted of the offence of causing activity without consent under s.4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.	The ‘purpose’ of the act encompassed more than just personal sexual gratification in this instance: the victim’s purpose encompassed sexual gratification of a non-existent woman, when the true purpose was his humiliation. As s.76 applied to instances of deceit as to the nature or purpose of the act, it did not matter that the victim was aware that the act was sexual in nature.
R v H [2005]	Assault by Penetration	D propositioned the victim sexually and attempted to pull her towards him and place a hand over her mouth by grabbing at the pocket of her tracksuit.  D was convicted of sexual assault contrary to s.3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.	CoA believed that Parliament did not intend to exclude touching a person’s clothing from the definition of sexual assault, given the broad definition in s.79. Does the jury consider that the touching could be sexual? If so, in all the circumstances of the case, does the jury consider that the purpose of the touching was sexual?
R v Yip-Chiu-Cheung [1994]	Conspiracy: Agreement	D entered into an agreement with an undercover narcotics officer in a hotel in Hong Kong agreeing to give the officer 5kg of heroin to be smuggled into Australia. In return, the officer was to receive 16000 US dollars. The police officer never flew into Australia and in fact never met D because of a cancelled flight. D was arrested and charged with conspiracy to traffic drugs contrary to Hong Kong’s penal code. D appealed on the ground that in law there was in fact no conspiracy because the police officer never had the requisite mens rea of intent to traffic the drugs as the officer had been in contact at all times with the authorities in both Hong Kong and in Australia.	Because the undercover agent had not intended to prevent the heroin being smuggled, but intended to arrest D and others after the smuggling had occurred, a conspiracy existed. The fact that the authorities did not intervene or prevent the offence occurring did not prevent it being a conspiracy.
R v Shillam [2013]	Conspiracy: Agreement	D bought cocaine from R, in order to sell. D had been observed by police surveillance units meeting with R and was arrested driving a van and carrying over six grams of cocaine which he had bought from R. When police raided R’s home, they found a hydraulic press and cutting agents along with two other dealers. Whilst R was the central figure, there was a single grand conspiracy between all of the Ds in producing and distributing the cocaine. D was charged with conspiracy to supply cocaine and was convicted.	There was no single grand conspiracy between the conspirators to supply cocaine amongst and between the networks of dealers of which Shillam was only one. Instead, each was guilty of a separate conspiracy with R to supply cocaine within their own network. Ds conspiracy to supply cocaine was merely with R.
R v Griffiths [1969]	Conspiracy: Agreement	D was a seller of limes who entered into a conspiracy with seven lime farmers to defraud the Ministry of Agriculture by submitting fraudulent subsidy claims. There was no evidence to suggest that any of them were even aware of the existence of the other farmers and were not aware that they were also part of a single conspiracy. All were charged with a single count of conspiracy and convicted.	Convictions were quashed. Each should have been charged with a separate count of conspiracy between themselves and the lime seller.
R v Jackson [1985]	Conspiracy: Course of Conduct	Four members of a gang shot their friend hoping that the judge in the friend’s burglary trial would show sympathy for him. Ds were charged with conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. Ds appealed arguing that they had not conspired to pervert the course of justice because their friend may in any event have been acquitted and that their actions did not affect the guilt worthiness of their friend.	CoA held that the important factor was whether an offence would have been committed if the Ds plan had worked as intended. It would have constituted a criminal offence because the defendant would have received a lesser sentence than he should have received.
R v Saik [2006]	Conspiracy: Mens Rea	D operated a bureau de change near Marble Arch in London where he changed money that had been gained as proceeds of crime into foreign currency. Whilst he did not know for sure that the money he was changing was obtained from the proceeds of crime, he suspected that it was. D was charged with conspiracy to launder money contrary to s. 93C(2) Criminal Justice Act 1988.	Whilst the substantive offence of money laundering could be carried out by D having reasonable suspicion that the money was a proceed of crime, a conspiracy, under s1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977 requires the parties to form an agreement which they intend will result in the commission of the crime.
R v G and F [2013]	Conspiracy: Mens Rea	After police searched one of D’s flat, they found indecent images of children on a laptop computer. The police then searched his mobile found and found a number of text messages exchanged between the two Ds. These text messages detailed an explicit plan to rape a six-year-old boy. One of D’s acquaintances had a child of the same age who matched the description of the boy discussed in the text messages. Ds were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit rape of a child under the age of 13 contrary to s. 5 Sexual Offences Act 2005.	Appeal allowed. No reasonable jury, properly directed could be sure on the evidence of the text messages alone that Ds intended to carry out the agreement. Where there was a discussed plan but it was not carried out a judge should give a direction to the jury on how to infer intent by summing up the sources of evidence that could be used by a jury to suggest that Ds actually intended to carry out their plan rather than to simply fantasize about the agreement. This was done by the judge.
Shaw v DPP [1962]		D created magazines which contained personal adverts for prostitutes with their contact details. The solicitation of prostitution was now illegal by virtue of the Street Offences Act 1959.  D also received money from the prostitutes for the directory; thus, he was living on the earnings of prostitutes. D was convicted of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, as well as acting contrary to s. 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and s. 2 of the Obscene Publications Act 1959 (publishing an obscene article).	Court found D’s decision to feature prostitute adverts in his magazines was as dangerous to the welfare of society and it was their duty to protect the public majority’s morals, as well as safety and order. Court was able to create offences in order to adapt to changing standards in life and in regard to the values and morals of society. This case created the new offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals and established that an offence that was not written in criminal statute could be recognised as a legal charge.
Knuller v DPP [1973]	Conspiracy: Conspiracy to Corrupt Public Morals or Outrage Public Decency	D was the director of a company which published regular magazines that included columns to advertise homosexual practices. It was concluded that this information encouraged males to meet up and engage in homosexual activity. D was convicted for conspiracy to corrupt public morals.	Confirming the Shaw v DPP verdict, the conviction was upheld. The courts now have no power to create new criminal offences and can only be created by Parliament.
R v Geddes [1996]	Attempt: Actus Reus	D was discovered in the toilets of a school to which he had no connection, with a rucksack containing a knife, rope and masking tape. D was convicted of attempted false imprisonment under section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.	Conviction quashed. D had a clear mens rea of intention to commit the offence under section 1 of false imprisonment, however he had not made any contact with his pupils and his preparatory actions of packing his rucksack and being in the school toilets did not surpass the preparation stage to the implementation and execution stage of that offence.
R v Campbell [1991]	Conspiracy: Actus Reus	D was arrested after loitering outside a post office, wearing sunglasses and carrying something heavy, after police had been informed that a robbery was going to take place. D had been waiting outside the post office, left, and then returned 30 minutes later, at which point he was arrested and discovered to have in his possession a gun and a demand note. D was convicted of attempted robbery.	A judge must restrict himself to directing a jury to the definition of attempt under the 1981 Act. Whether D intended to commit the crime in question? D had done an act which was more than merely preparatory to committing the offence? D had not even gone inside the post office where his offence was to be committed, making it doubtful whether he had performed an act which could properly be said to be an attempt. D’s conviction was quashed.
R v Shivpuri [1986]	Conspiracy: Mens Rea	D was persuaded to act as a drug courier. D collected a suitcase which contained several packages of white powder which he admitted in a police interview that he believed to be either heroin or cannabis but was in fact legal snuff. D was charged with attempting to knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring the controlled drug of heroin, under the 1981 Act and the 1979 Act, despite the fact that the white powder was not in fact drugs.	For section 170(1) of the 1979 Act to apply, it is immaterial that S did not know the exact nature of the substance in his possession, but nevertheless believed he was dealing with controlled drugs the importation of which was prohibited. The statutory offence attempt under section 1 of the 1981 Act requires (1) an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of an offence and (2) the accused intended to commit an offence. It is no defence that on the true facts it would have been impossible to commit the actual offence, which overruled the nation of ‘objective innocence’.
R v Taaffe [1984]	Conspiracy: Mens Rea	D was enlisted by a third party in Holland to import cannabis into England, which was prohibited to import under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. D, however, had mistakenly believed the substance to be currency, which D had believed was prohibited to import but was in fact not. D was charged under section 170(2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 of having been knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of cannabis and convicted.	‘Knowingly concerned’ under section 170(2) of the 1979 Act had to be read as actual knowledge that the substance in question was one the importation of which is prohibited. D’s mens rea for the impossible offence of smuggling currency could not be imported to the smuggling of drugs. D was to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be. Conviction was quashed.
R v Craig and Bentley (1952)	Secondary Parties: Summary Offences	Ds attempted to burgle a warehouse. B carried a knife and a knuckle-duster, given to him by C, and C carried a gun.  B was arrested, and while in the custody of the police he shouted “let him have it” to C, following which C entered into a gun fight with the Police Constable who died as a result. C was convicted of murder and B was convicted as an accomplice to murder.	A person who aids or encourages a crime can be held equally liable as the person who actually committed the crime. B was an accessory in the joint enterprise of the killing when resisting arrest, which was murder under the old common law principle of constructive malice which has now been replaced with diminished responsibility which royally pardoned B in 1993, years after he was hanged.
R v Bourne [1952]	Secondary Parties: Summary Offences	D subjected his wife to beastiality by terrorising her into submission against her will of sexual intercourse with a dog. D was convicted of aiding and abetting his wife to commit buggery with a dog. The offence of buggery requires only the act itself, the mens rea being irrelevant.	Mens rea or consent is immaterial to establishing the offence of buggery, whether with man or beast; the crime is committed if an act of buggery is committed. If it was shown that the principal offencer, the wife, acted under duress, it would not have shown that no offence had been committed but would excuse the wife from punishment. B was a principal in the second degree and an aider and abettor to the crime of buggery which was committed by A.
R v Millward [1994]	Secondary Parties: Principal Offence	D instructed his employee to take a vehicle which D knew to be in very poor and dangerous condition, out driving on a public road. The employee did so with no knowledge of the vehicle’s condition and was subsequently involved in a fatal collision with another car. D and employee were charged with causing death by reckless driving, but the employee was acquitted in the absence of the mens read due to his lack of knowledge of the vehicle’s state.	An accessory can be liable where the principal commits the actus reus of the offence, even if the principal lacks the necessary mens rea to be convicted himself. Today, under section 2A(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 it is expressly provided that the new offence of dangerous driving is committed where it is obvious to a competent and careful driver that driving the vehicle in its current state would be dangerous.
R v Calhaem [1985]	Secondary Parties: Causation	D was convicted of murder under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. D had counselled Z to murder the victim. Z decided not to carry out the murder but had gone berserk and eventually killed the victim anyway.	Within the meaning of s.8 AAA 1861, “counselling” did not require any causal connection between the counselling and the principal offence. An offence under s.8 was established by the presence of counselling and the principal offence was committed by the person counselled within the scope of the authorisation or instruction.
R v Clarkson [1971]	Secondary Parties: Causation	D were drinking when they heard sounds indicating that a woman was being raped. They entered the room but did nothing while the rapes were committed. It was possible that Ds had an intention to or actually encouraged the rapes. Ds were convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of three rapes.	In order to convict of aiding and abetting, it is not sufficient to show that the Ds were present during the commission of the principal offences. The prosecution also had to prove that Ds actually encouraged the offence. Convictions were quashed.
National Coal Board v Gamble [1959]	Secondary Parties: Mens Rea	A lorry driver had filled his lorry with coal at an NCB yard. The weighbridge operator noticed that the lorry was overloaded and informed the driver. The driver said he would take the risk and the operator gave him a weighbridge ticket. Driver was found guilty of using an overloaded lorry on the highway.	Aiding and abetting was proved if there was a positive act of voluntary assistance and knowledge of the circumstances constituting the offence. Motive is irrelevant in this case. The ownership of the coal did not pass until the ticket was handed over and, therefore, the driver could not properly have left the yard without it. Thus, the NCB’s actions constituted aiding and abetting.
R v JF Alford Transport [1997]	Secondary Parties: Mens Rea	A company, its managing director, and their transport manager were all charged with aiding and abetting their drivers in making false entries on their record sheets. It was submitted by the prosecution that the Ds must have accepted what the drivers were doing in falsifying the entries.	Court held while this was likely the case, it was insufficient for the purposes of imposing secondary liability. It needed to be shown on the facts of any case that something more than knowledge of the activity existed. It must be shown that a deliberate decision not to prevent its commission took place.
R v Jogee [2016]	Joint Enterprise: Mens Rea	D was charged with murder after spending the evening with another man, drinking and taking drugs. One of them went over to Mr Fyfe’s house, and Ms Reid called D to collect his friend. D remained outside with a bottle and shouted to his friend to do something to Mr Fyfe. D threatened threatened to smash a bottle over Mr Fyfe’s head. D’s friend then stabbed Mr Fyfe to death but D was at all times unaware that his friend was carrying a knife.	A conviction under the principle of joint enterprise should require that the secondary party intended  the primary party to commit the crime, rather than merely foresaw the possibility that they might do so. Did D assist or encourage the commission of the crime? In this assistance or encouragement, did D act with the requisite mental element of the offence? Conviction quashed by SC.
R v Hennessy [1989]	Automatism	D was a diabetic who was apprehended while driving a stolen car. When he later collapsed at the police station it became apparent that he was having a diabetic episode and that he had not taken his insulin for several days, at least in part because of emotional turmoil due to being left by his wife. Evidence was given that hyperglycaemia resulted in drowsiness and possibly degradation of one’s ability to understand what is happening around them, as well as of their physical and mental abilities. D was charged with both theft (contrary to the Theft Act 1968 c.60, s.1) and driving while disqualified (contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988 c.52 s.103). D relied on the defence of automatism but it was rejected.	Insanity is the correct defence to apply to a hypoglycemic episode, since this is caused by the underlying condition of diabetes and can properly be described as a disease of the mind. Automatism refers to situations where D’s actions are involuntary.
R v Quick [1973]	Automatism	D was a nurse at a hospital who suffered from hypoglycemia. D had taken insulin in the morning for his condition but had not eaten much during the day and had imbibed alcohol. He later blacked out and attacked his victim, who suffered black eyes, bruising and a fractured nose. D was charged with assault occasioning ABH contrary to s.47 Offences Against The Person Act 1861 and was convicted.	A sufferer of hypoglycemia can rely on the defence of automatism because the associated episodes are caused by the insulin (or lack thereof) which is an external factor, rather than by the diabetes, which is an internal factor. The conviction was quashed.
R v M’Naghten (1843)	Insane Automatism	D was obsessed with the PM at the time, Sir Robert Peel. D attempted to kill the PM by shooting him but instead shot and killed Edward Drummond who was the PM’s secretary. At trial it became evident that D was suffering from insane delusions at the time of the killing and was found not guilty by reason of insanity which led to public outcry.	Conviction was upheld. M’Naghten Rules provide the legal definition of insanity. They prove that a D wishing to rely on the defence of insanity must show that: They laboured under a defect of reason Caused by a disease of the mind; so that either D did not know the nature and quality of his acts, or that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
R v Clarke [1972]	Insane Automatism: Defect of Reason	D having been charged with theft, admitted that she had taken the goods but only because she was absentminded at the time due to depression.	This was not sufficient to constitute a defect of reason and the defence failed.
R v Kemp (1957)	Insane Automatism: Disease of the Mind	D assaulted his wife with a hammer. He had no previous history of violence and no apparent motive. D was charged with causing GBH contrary to the Offences Against The Person Act 1861. D argued that the attack was the result of loss of consciousness linked to arteriosclerosis, and was used as grounds for a defence of automatism. The trial judge however directed the jury that the appropriate defence was one of insanity.	Arteriosclerosis could amount to a disease of the mind due to its effect on a person’s reasoning ability. Essentially the court was not concerned with how a D got to a certain state of mind but that he reached that state and was in it at the time of committing the offence. The appropriate defence was insanity and not automatism.
R v Sullivan [1984]	Insane Automatism:  Disease of the Mind	D kicked a man and at the time of the attack he was suffering from epilepsy.	The judge ruled that on the evidence the appropriate defence was insanity and not automatism, and it should be classed as an internal factor.
R v Burgess [1991]	Insane Automatism: Disease of the Mind	D was charged with wounding with intent to do GBH.  D’s defence was that during the event he was sleepwalking and suffering from non-insane automatism. Judge ruled that on the medical evidence available the only defence available was insanity and found D not-guilty by reason of insanity.	The failure in B’s mind was due to an abnormality which manifested itself in violence and might recur. The court noted the absence of obvious external factors (concussion etc.) which could have caused the failure in B’s mind.
R v Codere (1916)	Insane Automatism: Effect of Defect	D appealed against his conviction for murder. At trial, expert witnesses had disagreed on whether he could be certified as insane.	Whilst it was clear that D was “abnormal mentally” there was sufficient evidence that he was conscious that the act was wrong and contrary to law.
R v Windle [1952]	Insane Automatism: Effect of Defect	D was convicted of murdering his wife. His wife had regularly spoke of committing suicide and doctors suggested that she was certifiably insane. Upon arrest, D said to the police: “I suppose they will hang me for this?” Medical evidence supported the view that he was suffering from a mental condition at the time of the crime.	The court must not consider whether an act is morally right or wrong but only whether it is lawful or unlawful. D was clearly aware that what he was doing was contrary to law, which was what the word “wrong” means. The plea of insanity was denied.
R v Bailey [1983]	Non-Insane Automatism: Reckless Defendant	D was convicted of wounding with intent. D claimed the defence of automatism caused by hypoglycemia as a result of failing to take food after a dose of insulin. At trial, the jury were directed to disregard the automatism defence as it does not apply to self-induced incapacity.	It is not common knowledge that a failure to ingest food after taking insulin will result in aggressive behaviour. Thus, self-induced automatism may provide a defence to crimes of basic intent. S did not provide a sufficient basis for the defence and there was substantial evidence that he had armed himself purposefully in order to carry out the attack.
R v Clarke [1972]	Non-Insane Automatism: Reckless Defendant	D suffered from type 1 diabetes and had a hypoglycemic attack at the wheel of his vehicle, causing him to hit two pedestrians on a footpath. D was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and sentenced to 4 years imprisonment.	He was reckless as to becoming an automaton as he must have, even briefly, become aware of what was happening and failed to take action by pulling over.
R v Hardie [1985]	Non-Insane Automatism: Reckless Defendant	D was charged with arson under ss 1(2) and (3) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, for allegedly intending to damage a woman’s property by being reckless. D consumed a large amount of valium to calm himself after the lady he was living with asked him to leave their flat. He returned in an intoxicated state and set fire to the wardrobe in his bedroom.	D’s state of mind had to be considered under s 1(2) of the CDA. Only when he performed the relevant act could the requirements of an intention to destroy or recklessness be established. Self-administration of a drug does not necessarily give rise to the assumption that it could not negatively affect the mens rea in the same way illegal drugs or alcohol could. The conviction was quashed.
R v Allen [1988]	Intoxication: Involuntary Intoxication	D consumed homemade wine that unknowingly to him was much stronger than he initially thought. As such, it had a much stronger effect on him than he anticipated. He sexually assaulted a person while under the influence of alcohol. He relied on the defence of involuntary intoxication and pleaded that he could not be responsible for his actions.	D’s drinking had been a voluntary act and that ignorance as to the strength of the alcohol being consumed was no defence. As he had chosen to drink alcohol, he should have known or ought to have known the risks of consumption.
R v Kingston [1994]	Intoxication: Involuntary Intoxication	D was involuntarily drugged by a friend. While D was intoxicated, his friend encouraged him to perform sexual acts on a 15 year old boy. The incident had been a set-up by his friend. Kingston was convicted of indecent assault. Kingston’s defence was that if he had not been drugged, he would not have acted the way he did.	Although the drugs had essentially done away with Kingston’s inhibitions, this did not negative the necessary mental element which was found to be present in Kingston’s conduct.
R v Lipman [1970]	Intoxication: Voluntary Intoxication	D was convicted of manslaughter for killing his friend while on a bad LSD trip. She suffered two blows to the head and died of asphyxia.	S.8 of the Act required that an unlawful killing under the influence of drink and drugs had to amount to manslaughter as a minimum conviction. D knew that the acts performed on the victim were dangerous and likely to result in death, knew that drugs were dangerous and risked serious harm to another or himself and knew that taking drugs in those circumstances was grossly negligent and reckless.
Attorney General for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963]	Intoxication: Voluntary Intoxication	D wanted to murder his wife and bought a knife and a bottle of whiskey to help him build up the courage. He was later on convicted for the murder.	No defence shall be afforded with regards to the lack of mens rea if they were aware that the act was illegal. If D had formed the mens rea had he been sober, he is guilty.
Jaggard v Dickinson [1981]	Intoxication: Intoxicated Mistakes	D caused criminal damage to the victim’s house, believing that the house belonged to her friend who would have consented to the damage.	Despite the drunken and unreasonable nature of the belief, s.5(2)(a) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 stated that so long as the belief was honestly held the reasonableness of the belief was irrelevant and thus D was found not guilty.
R v Hasan [2005]	Duress: Duress by Threat	D was charged with aggravated burglary. D was associated with a gang and relied on the defence of duress, pleading that he was blackmailed into committing the burglary to prevent his family from being harmed.	Defence of duress was unavailable for D because of his voluntary gang association and as such, he should have foreseen or ought to have foreseen the risk of being subjected to compulsion to commit criminal offences.
R v Cole [1994]	Duress: Specified Crime	D borrowed a sum of money from a violent loan shark. The amount due got out of hand and the loan shark threatened to inflict serious injury on Cole and his girlfriend if the money was not sharply repaid. D resorted to bank robbery to raise the necessary funds. In response to his charge for the offence D attempted to raise the defence of duress.	There was an insufficient link between the loan and the crime. He was not told to steal the money at any point by the loan shark, and therefore the defence failed.
R v Hudson and Taylor [1971]	Duress: Immediacy	Ds were charged with perjury having given false evidence by failing to identify an individual in the courtroom, during the course of a trial. They used the defence of duress on the basis that they had been frightened by threat of injury to them if they had identified the individual.	Convictions were quashed. An essential part of the defence of duress was that the threat should be enough to neutralise the will of the accused at the time the crime was committed. There was a present threat but the threatened harm need not follow instantly.
R v Abdul Hussain [1999]	Duress: Immediacy	Ds were Shiite Muslims living in Iraq who had been sentenced to death after giving evidence during torture. They had escaped to Sudan but feared that they were to be deported and sent back to Iraq to face their punishments. They hijacked an airplane and took it to London where after negotiations they surrendered to the UK authorities.	The execution of a threat need not be immediate and in this case there was sufficient immediacy for the defence to be applied.
R v Valderamma-Vega [1985]	Duress: Facing a Threat of Death or Serious Injury	D was practising homosexual activities during his marriage to a woman. D was confronted by threats to reveal this to his wife, alongside threats of serious injury to D and his family if he did not participate in the importation of illegal drugs.	The jury was permitted to consider the cumulative threats in this case. However, if threats of death or serious injury were not part of this, other such reasons could not be employed as a sufficient defence.
R v Shayler [2001]	Duress: To the Defendant or a Person For Whom He Has Responsibility	D was a member of MI5 and signed a confidentiality declaration in accordance with the Official Secrets Act 1989 and was therefore under a contractual obligation not to disclose information that came into his possession by way of his employment. When he left MI5, he signed a further declaration acknowledging its lasting effects. A year later, D disclosed documents to a national newspaper relating to national security and shortly afterward left the country. Upon his return, he was charged with disclosing this information without permission under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, s. 29.	As D was a former member of the security service, he could not rely on the defence of necessity or duress in relation to the Official Secrets Act 1989.
R v Conway [1989]	Duress: To the Defendant or a Person For Whom He Has Responsibility	D was arrested for driving recklessly in contradiction of the Road Traffic Act 1972, s.2. Conway had driven away from plain-clothed police officers in a reckless manner. D’s defence was that he acted under duress and that due to the circumstances he feared for his and his passenger’s life. His passenger was the victim of a shotgun attack under similar circumstances several weeks prior to this and sustained serious injuries from this. Conway was convicted of reckless driving, sentenced to 6 months imprisonment and was banned from driving for 18 months.	It was held by the court that it was immaterial whether the defence in this instance was termed as duress or necessity but that if D was acting in order to avoid a threat of serious harm or death, the judge was required to direct the jury to consider this in accordance with their verdict. The trial judge did not do so and the conviction was therefore quashed.
R v Dudley and Stephens (1884)	Necessity	Two Ds and a boy were cast away in an open boat at sea following a storm. After seven days without food and five without water, S suggested that lots should be drawn with the loser being put to death to provide food for the remaining two. However, D and S colluded to the extent that the boy should be killed. On the 20th day, D killed the boy and both Ds ate him for the following four days until rescue.	Defence of necessity was not available as a defence to murder on these facts. Ds were convicted of murder.
Re F (Mental patient sterilisation) [1990)	Necessity	F was an adult woman who had suffered from a severe mental disability since she was a baby. During her stay in the hospital she developed a sexual relationship with another patient. Staff were concerned at the impact a potential pregnancy would have on her and knew she would not be able to raise a child. Patient’s mother sought a declaration from the court that such steps would not be unlawful for lack of consent. A declaration was given.	Although under the common law a doctor was able to operate on a patient who was unable to consent when it was in the patients’ best interest and therefore the consent of the court was not strictly necessary, given the particular nature of sterilisation, the court should be consulted in these circumstances. The judges considered that in this circumstance the principle of necessity could be given recognition.
Re A [2001]	Necessity	Parents of conjoined twins appealed against a decision to allow an operation to surgically separate them which would result in the death of one twin who had major medical issues already.	The court was required to balance the interest of the children against one another and concluded that the balance fell in favour of the healthy twin. The operation would not constitute murder because the three elements required to raise a defence of necessity were present.
R v Quayle [2005]	Necessity	Ds appealed against convictions for the cultivation, production and possession of cannabis and cannabis resin. 3 of them suffered from various medical illnesses and the two others supplied cannabis to them from a holistic centre.	Individuals were not qualified to self-prescribe. It added the fourth criteria: the necessity must have arisen in extraneous circumstances. Neither the defence of necessity nor duress of circumstances was applicable in such circumstances.
R v Dyson [1908]	Legal Causation	A child’s certain and imminent death due to meningitis was accelerated by the child’s father’s infliction of serious injuries.	Father was charged with murder since accelerating death is enough for the law to consider someone as causing death.
R v Gosney [1971]	Legal Causation	D drove her car at night on the wrong side of a dual carriageway.	Conviction quashed because she had made the same mistake as a reasonable driver would have made.
R v Adams [1957]	Legal Causation	A doctor had administered a lethal dose of painkillers to a terminally ill patient.	Doctor was acquitted since a doctor is entitled to do all that is proper to relieve pain and suffering even if such measures may incidentally shorten life.
Southern Water Authority v Pegrum[1989]	Legal Causation	Ds were charged with causing pollution matter to enter a stream after heavy rain blocked the waste from a drain to flow into the lagoon.	Ds were liable under the provisions of the governing act if they ‘caused’ the escape of the polluting material, and an act of God was not a defence here.
DPP v Daley [1979]	Legal Causation	Ds were indicted for murder, the prosecution allegation being that they had stoned the deceased as he ran away from them. Medical evidence suggested that death was due to either stoning or to a blow received in falling to the ground.	The court was not satisfied that the deceased’s death was caused by being hit by stones, but rather by the fall. Ds were convicted of manslaughter.
R v Williams; R v Davies [1992]	Legal Causation	Ds picked up a hitchhiker who was on his way to Glastonbury. Ds attempted to rob the victim who jumped out of the moving vehicle and died.	Ds were found not guilty since there was an almost total lack of evidence as to the nature of the threat.
R v Malcherek; R v Steele [1981]	Legal Causation	M stabbed his wife. S was accused of sexually assaulting and beating a woman over the head with a stone. In both cases the victims had been taken to hospital and placed on life support machines, which were later on switched off. Ds argued that the doctors’ actions constituted a novus actus interveniens.	Convictions upheld as the victims were already braindead, dead, when the machines were switched off so therefore the doctors were not the cause of death.
R v Mellor [1996]	Legal Causation	D appealed against a conviction of the murder of  a 71 year old man who died two days after being admitted to hospital with face and chest injuries.	Appeal dismissed as the burden was on the prosecution to show that the injuries inflicted contributed significantly to the victim’s death.
R v Hayward (1908)	Legal Causation	D chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died although D did not touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death by physical exertion and panic. D and wife were unaware of this condition.	D was liable for constructive manslaughter as his unlawful act caused death. Egg shell skull rule applied.
R v McKechnie and others (1991)	Legal Causation	Ds attacked an elderly man, causing brain damage. In the hospital a stomach ulcer was discovered but could not be treated due to the brain damage and it caused him death.	Ds were responsible for the death of the man. Egg shell skull rule applies, and brain damage was a substantial cause of death as it prevented life-saving treatment.
R v Roberts [1971]	Legal Causation	After a party D give the victim a lift home. D began making sexual advances which were rejected, and then D tried to pull off her coat.Victim jumped out of the car and sustained injuries.	D was convicted of actual bodily harm but acquitted of sexual assault. The act could be foreseen by a reasonable person and therefore did not break the chain of causation.
R v Gibbins & Proctor (1918)	Omissions	Ds were convicted of the murder of Gibbin’s daughter, it being alleged that she died of starvation as the result of a long course of cruelty and neglect at the hands of both Ds.	The neglect by a father of a child living with him may be so great, even though he provides the funds for the child’s maintenance, as to amount to murder, if through neglegt the child dies. A woman living with a man in such circumstances, if she has accepted charge of the child, may also be guilty of murder.
R v Bonnyman (1942)	Duty arising from relationship	D was convicted of the manslaughter by negligence of his wife. D’s case was that his wife was stubborn and would not let him do anything for her. Appeal based on direction to jury.	Appeal dismissed as the degree of negligence necessary to support a charge of the manslaughter of a helpless person was clear  and overwhelming through evidence.
R v Smith (1979)	Duty arising from relationship	After a jury trial D was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.	First degree murder charge substituted for second degree murder as the jury could not conclude that the killing was planned based on the evidence.
People v Beardsley [1907]	Duty arising from relationship	A married man was having an affair with a woman. In his presence, she overdosed on morphine. He was intoxicated at the time and arranged for an acquaintance to take the woman to another room in the house. The woman subsequently died and the man was convicted of manslaughter.	Decision reversed as the accused had no legal duty to the woman to take reasonable measures to prevent her death. No legal duty existed and the respondent was not an active agent in the death, therefore no criminal liability attached.
R v Russell [1933]	Duty arising from relationship Omission	Russell’s wife had decided that she wanted to drown herself and her children in the bathtub. He watched her as she did so and did nothing to intervene.	Russell was guilty of manslaughter as he had a legal duty to care for his wife and his children.
R v Steane [1947]	Nature of intent	Appellant was a British radio announcer who was living in Germany during WWII. With his family under threat he was forced to broadcast on the radio for the Nazis. After the war, when he returned to Britain, he was charged with “doing acts likely to help the enemy with the intent to assist the enemy”. He was convicted at trial and appealed.	Appeal allowed. The specific form of intention that is required for conviction is explained in the crime itself, and this must be respected.
Chandler v DPP [1964]	Nature of intent	Defendants wished to show opposition to nuclear weapons by planning to immobilize an RAF airbase by sitting on its runway. They were convicted for conspiracy under the Official Secrets Act. They appealed arguing they acted in the interest of the State.	The court held that the deployment of armed forces was completely up to Government and it is not up to individuals to question the way the power was exercised. It was not a question for the judiciary but a political question.
R v Woollin [1999]	Intention	D threw his 3 month old baby to the ground in frustration when it would not stop crying, leading to the baby dying from a fractured skull.	HoL substituted murder charge for manslaughter. Virtual certainty test, Nedrick, should be used when considering oblique intention.
R v G [2003]	Recklessness	Two boys, aged 11 and 12, went camping for a night without their parents’ permission. The boys found some old newspapers outside the Co-op which they lit with a lighter and then threw under a wheelie bin. They then left without putting them out assuming they would naturally burn out. In fact the burning newspapers set light to the wheelie bin and the fire spread to the Co-op shop and caused over £1m of damage.	A person acts recklessly  when: (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk. The boys were not guilty of recklessly causing criminal damage as recklessness requires a subjective test.  Caldwell overruled.
R v Kaitamaki [1984]	Rape		Whilst sexual intercourse occurs at the point of penetration, it was also a continuing act that ceases only at the point of withdrawal. A defendant will be liable if they become aware during sexual intercourse that the victim no longer consents and fails to withdraw at that point.
R v Olugboja [1981]	Rape		In cases where it is suggested that the sexual intercourse was through force or fear of force, it is unlikely to be necessary to direct the jury beyond explaining the meaning of the word. When the issue is less clear the jury should be directed to consider the state of mind of the victim immediately before the act and the events leading up to it.
R v Bree [2007]	Rape		Where a person loses their capacity to consent to due intoxication, they indeed cannot consent.
Assange v Sweedish Prosecution Authority [2011]	Rape		The nature of the act was unaffected, and the consent was not valid.