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Facts: D was the steel company that employed C. C fell and hit his head at work and suffered depression and a pre-existing skin disease flared up, not because of the original injury “but from his anger at the happening of the accident”. Ratio: C was entitled to compensation for the consequences of the accident and not just for the physical injuries. C was a primary victim.

Facts: C argued that the choice of the telephone as a means of alerting and reassuring people, who had received treatment from a health worker later found to be HIV+ was not correct. Ratio: There was no breach of a duty to care, even though some people called had suffered distress.

Facts: Police officers suffered shock following their involvement in the rescue and aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster. Issue: Whether an employer owed a duty of care to protect their employees from psychiatric injuries they may incur in the course of their employment? To be determined whether they were primary victims or not? Ratio: Claim failed. HoL founds that they were not primary victims, and they also were not secondary victims under the Alcock criteria.

Facts: Former asbestos workers claimed that their employers’ negligence in exposing them to asbestos had led to anxiety and depression due to fear that they could contract a serious asbestos-related disease in the future. Issue: Whether the symptomless plaques were, in and of themselves, a form of actionable damage? Ratio: HoL did not consider that the exposure could count as a ‘zone of danger’ to make the C primary victims.

Facts: A mother suffered as a result of the negligent treatment leading to the death of her baby son. Ratio: Mother was able to recover as a secondary victim for psychiatric harm as the court held that the 36-hour period prior to her son’s death could be classed as a single horrifying event.

Facts: S appealed against the High Court’s decision to strike out his statement of claim for personal injury damages on the grounds that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed. S brought an action against the hospital alleging their negligent treatment of his son caused him to suffer psychiatric injury. Ratio: Appeal dismissed. However, even where a statement of claim disclosed no cause of action, the court had discretion to permit the plaintiff to amend it out of time provided that the proposed amendment arose from the facts in the pleading. S was unable to recover for psychiatric harm sustained as a result of watching his son die over a period of 14 days while becoming increasingly aware that the hospital was negligent in its treatment of him.

Facts: A engaged BG to install central heating in her home and returned to find the loft on fire. The house and contents were extensively damaged, and the property claim was settled, but A also claimed for nervous shock. Issue: Whether a claim lay for nervous shock caused by witnessing property damage, rather than personal injury? Ratio: Recovery of damages was possible in such circumstances, provided the elements of liability were proved, and the matter ought to go to trial.

Facts: B appealed against a decision that V was entitled to recover damages for mental illness after witnessing the aftermath of a car accident caused by B’s negligent driving in which V’s two children died. B accepted that V was entitled to damages for nervous shock, but argued that further damages for normal grief and bereavement contributing to the failure of V’s business ought to have been discounted as too remote. Issue: Whether distress constitutes a ‘medically recognised condition’ such as to found a claim for damages for pure psychiatric injury in the tort of negligence? Ratio: Appeal dismissed. Although grief and bereavement suffered due to the death of a family member were not actionable themselves, they were part and parcel of the nervous shock suffered by V as a consequence of witnessing the accident, notwithstanding that V’s mental illness was a pathological reaction. There was sufficient evidence to find that the failure of V’s business was not...

Facts: Mrs Palmer alleged that the defendant health authority had been negligent in its assessment of a mentally ill patient – Armstrong – who kidnapped, sexually assaulted, killed and mutilated her 4-year-old daughter Rosie upon his release from a secure unit. While under treatment for his illness, Armstrong stated that he had sexual feelings towards children and threatened to abduct and murder a child. Post-release, he failed to attend an outpatient appointment. Issue: Whether there was a duty of care towards the family of a child killed by a mentally disordered man being seen as an out-patient but not detained? Ratio: CoA, relying on Hill , found that the health authority owed neither Mrs Palmer nor Rosie a duty of care, as the necessary level of proximity between the claimants and the defendant did not exist. The child was not identifiable as a potential victim (as in Hill ), meaning the health authority could have done nothing to prevent her murder, oth...

Facts: C’s mother died suddenly three weeks after being negligently injured at work. C developed PTSD, as a result of witnessing her mother’s death (she was not present at the original accident or its immediate aftermath). In bringing her claim against her mother’s employers, C argued that proximity existed between the accident and her mother’s collapse and death. Issue: Could recovery from mental injury as a secondary victim from a delayed event occur? Ratio: Claim rejected by CoA. There was one accident which had two consequences. If C was in physical proximity to her mother at the time of the accident and had suffered shock and psychiatric illness as a result of seeing the accident and the injuries sustained by her mother, she would qualify as a secondary victim, however this is not the case here.

Facts: A mother came upon the scene where her daughter had been hit by a dangerous driver and was told that her daughter was dead. Part of the shock she suffered was due to this experience and the other part was caused when she saw her daughter’s body in the mortuary some two hours later. Ratio: In this case, the aftermath extended from the moment of the accident until the moment the mother left the mortuary.

Facts: A mother arrived at the hospital two hours after her family had been injured in a car accident and the shock of what she saw led to severe psychological illness. Issue: HoL to determine the nature and extent of the duty owed by the defendant to persons whom his action might cause psychiatric damage. Ratio: HoL found in favour of McLoughlin, that the nervous shock was reasonably foreseeable.

Facts: Defendant had been drinking with his friend H. With H’s permission D proceeded to drive H’s car, with H himself as a passenger. D was responsible for a serious collision with an oncoming vehicle. H did not suffer any serious injuries but D was left trapped inside the car, unconscious and with a severe head injury. The emergency services arrived which was the claimant, a fire officer and the father of D. Having to attend to his son in such circumstances caused C to develop PTSD and sued D in negligence. Issue: Whether, and in what circumstances, a person could be liable in negligence to a close family member for any self-inflicted harm that, having been witnessed by said family member, had caused them suffer lasting psychiatric damage? Ratio: The court, finding in favour of C, rejected the claim on policy grounds. Whilst it was correct that C fell within the definition of a secondary victim, a primary victim could not be liable in negligence to a famil...

Facts: C was involved in a motor accident, due to the D’s negligence. D suffered a recurrence of M.E. Issue: Whether it is necessary to establish that this particular type of harm was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence, or whether it would suffice merely that some form of compensable harm was foreseeable? Ratio: It was held that a duty was owed to him in respect of psychological injury. C was a primary victim due to the fact that he was in the range of possible physical injury, and therefore the Alcock criteria did not apply.

Facts: A pregnant woman suffered shock leading to a stillbirth when she heard a motorcycle accident and later saw blood on the road. Issue: Whether D owed a duty of care to C? Ratio: D owed no duty to C in respect of her injury, which was unforeseeable as she was outside the range of danger.

Facts: Local authority was aware that a bank of land was obstructing the view at a junction where three accidents had occurred in the previous 12 years Authority had discussed the matter with the landowners and agreed to carry out the required work No action had been taken and the plaintiff was seriously injured in an accident Plaintiff claimed damages from the driver and local authority Issue: Whether a local authority could be found to owe a common law duty of care if it had not complied with a public law obligation? Ratio: Highways Act 1980, s 79 did allow a local authority the power to remove obstructions. However, the statutory power did not give rise to a common law duty of care and N had not acted unreasonably in failing to proceed under that power. Even if the work ought to have been carried out, it could not be found that a public law duty gave rise to an obligation to compensate those suffering loss due to its non-performance.