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Facts: C and D were transporting a large quantity of cannabis when D negligently lost control of the vehicle. C was seriously injured. Trial judge rejected his claim in negligence on the basis that the parties were engaged in an unlawful enterprise. C appealed. Ratio: Appeal allowed in part. On the balance of probabilities the transportation of illegal drugs had been the purpose of the journey. The defence of illegality was not applicable since as ‘a matter of causation the damage suffered by C was not caused by his criminal act’.

Facts: A serious injury due to the negligence of D led to C being sentenced for manslaughter. Issue: Whether the intervention of G’s criminal act in the causal relationship between T’s breaches of duty and the damage of which he complained of prevented him from recovering that loss caused by the criminal act? Ratio: The claim was based upon a criminal act for which C was responsible. According to the principle of illegality, D was not liable for effects of that act.

Facts: C was injured as a consequence of jumping from a second-floor window to escape custody of the police. C sued D for damages, claiming that they had not taken reasonable care to prevent him from escaping. Attempting to escape from lawful custody is a criminal offence. Ratio: Appeal dismissed. A police officer carrying out an arrest did not owe the person being arrested a duty of care to prevent him from injuring himself in a foreseeable attempt to escape from custody, an unlawful act.

Facts: C was injured on a drunken plane flight. Issue: Does volenti apply as a defence to C’s negligence claim? Ratio: C had colluded in the dangerous venture and his claim was defeated by the defence of volenti .

Facts: C was injured in a car accident that was the result of the negligent driving of D who had been drinking. C brought a claim for damages against D’s estate. D raised the defence of volenti non fit injuria . Issue: Can the defence of volenti be used in order to preclude from remedy a person who has voluntarily accepted the risk which arises from a driver who is driving a car under the influence of alcohol? Ratio: Judgment in favour of C. Volenti applied to negligence only in cases where C by his words or conduct has impliedly agreed to absolve D from liability, which was not the scenario in this case. Simply knowing the risk is not enough; C must accept it.

Facts: C, a policeman, saw a horse running loose in the street among children. He ran out, chased it and caught it but was injured. Issue: Does volenti non fit injuria prevent on-duty police officers from claiming damages for an injury sustained as a consequence of acting whilst being aware of the risk that this involves? Ratio: D was guilty of negligence by virtue of leaving the horses unattended in a busy street. Police are under general duty to intervene to protect life and property and therefore, the act of C and his injuries were a direct consequence of D’s negligence. Volenti does not prevent C from claiming damages as he did not voluntarily agree to take the risk but did not voluntarily agree to take the risk but did it pursuant to his official duty.

Facts: A driving instructor sued in negligence against a pupil when he was injured in an accident she caused on her third lesson. Ratio: The duty of care to be expected of a learner driver is that of the reasonably competent and experienced driver, and therefore the claim was successful.

Facts: D was employed as a shotfirer in a quarry, and was to test the electric wiring connecting explosive charges. Contrary to instructions that testing must be done from a shelter, D carried out a test in the open and was injured. Issue: Whether the employer could rely on the defence of volenti non fit injuria as the brothers acted  in neglect of express instructions and mandatory precautions, with knowledge of the associated risks? Ratio: Court held that an employer is able to rely on volenti non fit injuria as a complete defence to vicarious liability when the employees act in deliberate neglect. The two brothers had contributed to their own injuries.

Facts: C was severely injured in an accident when hit by a motorcyclist. C was not wearing a cycle helmet and the injuries were to his head when was slowing down and was hit by D approaching from the other direction. Ratio: Judgment for claimant. On the balance of probabilities, D had been travelling at excess speed. He was entirely to blame for the collision. On the balance of probabilities, C would not have sustained less injuries had he wore a helmet. D failed to discharge the burden of proving contributory negligence.

Facts: C sought damages after an accident. D was a car driver who had negligently moved forward into the path of the C, a motorcyclist, who was injured. D argued that C was contributorily negligent in not wearing a crash helmet. Issue: Does a motorist’s failure to wear a helmet amount to contributory negligence in case of an accident? Ratio: Appeal allowed. C should have foreseen the possibility of being in an accident. C must bear some of the responsibility for the consequences of the accident and the amount of damages is to be reduced by 15 per cent.

Facts: Both C and D had drunk about eight to nine pints of beer, and on their way home the driver lost control of his car so that it collided with a lamppost. The passenger sued in negligence. Driver said the passenger was contributorily negligent. Issue: Is the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence for his failure to wear a seat belt? Is the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence for his failure to foresee the possibility that the driver’s ability to drive was impaired by alcohol? Ratio: C is not guilty of contributory negligence for his failure to wear a seat belt as the defendant did not prove that C’s injuries would have been less serious had he wore a seat belt. C is guilty of contributory negligence for his failure to foresee the possibility that the driver’s ability to drive was impaired by alcohol as they were aware of this.

Facts: D was the steel company that employed C. C fell and hit his head at work and suffered depression and a pre-existing skin disease flared up, not because of the original injury “but from his anger at the happening of the accident”. Ratio: C was entitled to compensation for the consequences of the accident and not just for the physical injuries. C was a primary victim.

Facts: C argued that the choice of the telephone as a means of alerting and reassuring people, who had received treatment from a health worker later found to be HIV+ was not correct. Ratio: There was no breach of a duty to care, even though some people called had suffered distress.

Facts: Police officers suffered shock following their involvement in the rescue and aftermath of the Hillsborough disaster. Issue: Whether an employer owed a duty of care to protect their employees from psychiatric injuries they may incur in the course of their employment? To be determined whether they were primary victims or not? Ratio: Claim failed. HoL founds that they were not primary victims, and they also were not secondary victims under the Alcock criteria.

Facts: Former asbestos workers claimed that their employers’ negligence in exposing them to asbestos had led to anxiety and depression due to fear that they could contract a serious asbestos-related disease in the future. Issue: Whether the symptomless plaques were, in and of themselves, a form of actionable damage? Ratio: HoL did not consider that the exposure could count as a ‘zone of danger’ to make the C primary victims.

Facts: A mother suffered as a result of the negligent treatment leading to the death of her baby son. Ratio: Mother was able to recover as a secondary victim for psychiatric harm as the court held that the 36-hour period prior to her son’s death could be classed as a single horrifying event.

Facts: S appealed against the High Court’s decision to strike out his statement of claim for personal injury damages on the grounds that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed. S brought an action against the hospital alleging their negligent treatment of his son caused him to suffer psychiatric injury. Ratio: Appeal dismissed. However, even where a statement of claim disclosed no cause of action, the court had discretion to permit the plaintiff to amend it out of time provided that the proposed amendment arose from the facts in the pleading. S was unable to recover for psychiatric harm sustained as a result of watching his son die over a period of 14 days while becoming increasingly aware that the hospital was negligent in its treatment of him.

Facts: A engaged BG to install central heating in her home and returned to find the loft on fire. The house and contents were extensively damaged, and the property claim was settled, but A also claimed for nervous shock. Issue: Whether a claim lay for nervous shock caused by witnessing property damage, rather than personal injury? Ratio: Recovery of damages was possible in such circumstances, provided the elements of liability were proved, and the matter ought to go to trial.

Facts: B appealed against a decision that V was entitled to recover damages for mental illness after witnessing the aftermath of a car accident caused by B’s negligent driving in which V’s two children died. B accepted that V was entitled to damages for nervous shock, but argued that further damages for normal grief and bereavement contributing to the failure of V’s business ought to have been discounted as too remote. Issue: Whether distress constitutes a ‘medically recognised condition’ such as to found a claim for damages for pure psychiatric injury in the tort of negligence? Ratio: Appeal dismissed. Although grief and bereavement suffered due to the death of a family member were not actionable themselves, they were part and parcel of the nervous shock suffered by V as a consequence of witnessing the accident, notwithstanding that V’s mental illness was a pathological reaction. There was sufficient evidence to find that the failure of V’s business was not...

Facts: Mrs Palmer alleged that the defendant health authority had been negligent in its assessment of a mentally ill patient – Armstrong – who kidnapped, sexually assaulted, killed and mutilated her 4-year-old daughter Rosie upon his release from a secure unit. While under treatment for his illness, Armstrong stated that he had sexual feelings towards children and threatened to abduct and murder a child. Post-release, he failed to attend an outpatient appointment. Issue: Whether there was a duty of care towards the family of a child killed by a mentally disordered man being seen as an out-patient but not detained? Ratio: CoA, relying on Hill , found that the health authority owed neither Mrs Palmer nor Rosie a duty of care, as the necessary level of proximity between the claimants and the defendant did not exist. The child was not identifiable as a potential victim (as in Hill ), meaning the health authority could have done nothing to prevent her murder, oth...